We stud y an oligopolistic ind ustry where firms are able to sell in a futures market at infinitely many moments prior to the spot market. A kindof Folk-theorem is established: any outcome between perfect competition andCournot can be sustainedin equilibrium. We then find that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. However, this is not true for the competitive outcome. Furthermore, only the monopolistic outcome is renegotiation-proof if firms can buy and sell in the futures market. These results suggest, contrary to existing literature, that the introduction of futures markets may have an anti-competitive effect.
Introduction
Future markets for contracting output may arise as a consequence of firms' attempt to insure themselves against price fluctuations or to take ad vantage of arbitrage opportunities. The strategic consequences of the introd uction of futures markets, however, are unclear. Williams [9] studies this issue in a model where firms' positions in the futures market affect their cost of prod uction in the spot market, thus altering the circumstances of competition. The strategic interaction between the two markets in a Cournot d uopoly is stud ied by Allaz and Villa [1] (A&V henceforth). They find that the introduction of a futures market induces firms to compete more aggressively. Specifically, A&V show that as the number of periods prior to the spot market at which firms can contract in the futures market increases, the equilibrium outcome approaches the competitive outcome.
In this paper we study a model identical to A&V's, except that the number of periods prior to the spot market where firms can contract in the futures market is infinite. Contrary to A&V, we find that any price between the competitive and Cournot prices can be sustained by a subgame perfect equilibrium. A result that resembles a Folk theorem is thus obtained. (Note, however, that our model is not a repeated game.) We then study the robustness of equilibria to renegotiation, and show that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium (RPE), whereas the competitive outcome cannot. Furthermore, the Cournot outcome is the unique outcome that can be sustained as a symmetric RPE. Finally, we show that if firms are allowed to buy (as well as to sell) in the futures market, then the unique outcome that can be sustained by an RPE is the monopoly outcome. Contrary to A&V, our findings suggest that the introduction of a futures market is likely to have an anti-competitive effect.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the benchmark model. In Section 3 the infinite case is analyzed and the main results are presented. Section 4 concludes.
The basic model
In this section, we present the mod el in [1] . Consid er a Cournot d uopoly for a homogeneous good where firms can produce at zero cost, and face a market demand given by p ¼ A À q if qA½0; A; and p ¼ 0 i f q > A ðp; qX0Þ: Prior to competing in the spot market, firms may sell part of their production in a futures market. Denote by s i X0 and f i X0 the quantities that Firm i sells in the spot and futures market, respectively, and write q i ¼ s i þ f i : We assume that positions in the futures market are observable. To find the subgame perfect equilibria of this game we proceed backward s. In the second stage, given ðf 1 ; f 2 Þ Firm i solves max s i ps i s:t:
The solution gives us the reaction function s i ¼ for i ¼ 1; 2: Therefore, equilibrium quantities and price are f
Note that in this framework the introduction of a futures market has a procompetitive effect (the Cournot equilibrium, in the absence of the futures market, is q
). To understand the source of this effect, suppose that
In this case firms behave as if Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader and Firm 2 the follower. This is not an equilibrium as Firm 2 also has an incentive to take positions in the futures market. The result is that firms enter a prisoners' dilemma resulting in a higher quantity being produced by the industry in equilibrium.
If firms are allowed to hold positions at ToN periods in the futures market, the equilibrium is calculated in a similar fashion, by simply adding additional stages and solving backwards. The equilibrium outcome (see A&V for further details) is given Thus, the limit of the equilibrium outcome as T goes to infinity is the competitive outcome (q ¼ q 1 þ q 2 ¼ A and p ¼ 0).
The infinite case
In this section we study the equilibria of an industry identical to the one described in Section 2, introducing an infinite number of periods in the futures market. Specifically, the futures market is open at times in T ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 ; yg; with t k ¼ k kþ1 and kAf1; 2; yg: The spot market takes place at time t ¼ 1: Recall that in Section 2 we found that the limit of the equilibria as the number of periods in the futures market goes to infinity gives the competitive outcome. Although this limit is one of the equilibria in the infinite case, in Proposition 2 we show that there are many others. 
, F i is the accumulated futures positions by Firm i at the time of the spot market, and F is the total by both firms-note that F i and F are well defined). If F is sold in the futures market, firms compete a la Cournot in the spot market for the residual demand q ¼ A À F À p: Because there is no discount, no-arbitrage requires that prices in all markets be the same.
The actions of firms at different stages are defined recursively. At time t 1 Firm i chooses f Payoffs are profits defined by P i ¼ pq i ; where q i ¼ F i þ s i ; and q ¼ q 1 þ q 2 : Proposition 1 characterizes the set of payoffs that can be sustained by subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). The following sets in R 2 þ will play an important role:
Simple algebra shows that ð f 1 ; f 2 ÞAF if and only if
; and that ðP 1 ; P 2 ÞAP if and only if there exists a ð
: Proposition 1. A pair of profits, ðP 1 ; P 2 Þ; may be sustained by an SPE if and only if it belongs to P:
below we construct a strategy profile that gives payoffs ðP n 1 ; P n 2 Þ and show that it is an SPE: (i) defines actions for every stage of the game in the different subgames, (ii)-(iv) classify subgames in three groups (states), C; P 1 and P 2 ; according to history.
(i) At time t k ; if the game is at state C; firms play ð f
whereas if the game is at state P j firms play f
(ii) At t 1 the game is said to be at state C: (iii) If the game is in state C at time t k ; then, at time t kþ1 (a) it remains at state
If the game is in state P j at time t k ; then, at time t kþ1 (a) it goes to state C if f Notice that the strategy profile described in (i)-(iv) is well defined, and that, by construction, it gives payoffs ðP n 1 ; P n 2 Þ: Now we show that this strategy is an SPE, i.e., a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. : If Firm j chooses f k j a0 it can get at most the solution to the following problem:
where P ; with the other variables following the expressions
and P
: Hence we conclude that no one-stage deviations are profitable at state C: Case 2: Deviation by Firm j in state P j : Repeat Case 1 except that now
; and P i ¼ 
This means that, in these subgames, Firm i is already playing its best reply given no further future positions, which is the case if firms follow the described strategy. Unless Firm i plays f 
Hence
Þ for infinitely many moments t k :
In ord er to complete the proof, we need to show that profits not in P cannot be supportedby an SPE. However, simple algebra shows that profits not in P can only be attained with negative futures positions.
The strategy in the proof is simple, although formally requires some elaboration. Firms start by holding enough positions in the futures market to set price and total quantities at the desired level. A firm holds no more positions in the futures market unless the rival does. In this case it sells in this market as well. Note that q 1 þ q 2 ¼ A leads to a competitive outcome, ðq 1 ; q 2 Þ ¼ ðA À 2q 2 ; A À 2q 1 Þ leads to a Cournot solution, and that other quantities in O lead to intermediate situations. Specifically, the sets F; O; and P show the futures positions, total quantities and profits that can be sustained by an SPE (other than F 1 þ F 2 > A and q 1 þ q 2 > A; which are uninteresting ways of obtaining zero profits.)
This result resembles Folk theorems in Game Theory. However, this infinite version of the basic model is not a repeated game, and Folk theorems cannot be invoked in proving Proposition 1. In particular, subgames are different if they come after a different history in terms of the accumulated futures positions. Hence, subgames in later periods are, in general, a reduced version of the original game (because of the reduced residual demand), and one has to make sure that payoffs in the remaining game are sufficient to sustain punishments.
Renegotiation
To study the robustness of equilibria we concentrate on the property of renegotiation-proofness. An equilibrium is renegotiation-proof if there is no other equilibrium that is better for both players in any subgame. For one-stage games, this idea is captured by selecting, within the set of Nash equilibria, those that give Pareto optimal outcomes. This definition is called Pareto Optimal Nash equilibrium. The definition of Pareto perfect equilibrium (PPE) provides the natural extension for finite games. A PPE is an equilibrium that, in the first stage of the game, selects Pareto optimal Nash equilibria within the set of Nash equilibria that are PPE in the continuation of the game. Note that one cannot provide a recursive definition for infinite games. This difficulty has been addressed in different ways. Here we present one of the best known and most demanding definitions: A SPE s is said to be a strongly renegotiation proof equilibrium (SRPE) if there is no other SPE s 0 and a subgame g such that, for all players, U Þ is the utility to player i of following a given strategy conditioned on the game being at subgame g:
This concept of SRPE is originally defined for repeated games (see [2, 3] . We present its natural extension to standard extensive form games. Note that the definition of SRPE is very strong. An SPE may fail to be an SRPE because there exists another SPE which, conditioned on some subgame, gives higher payoffs. Nothing, however, is said about the viability of this other equilibrium. We do not bother about this problem since Propositions 2 and 3 show that SRPE exist and, furthermore, that the non-SRPE are payoff-dominated by SRPE. Again, we need to define some sets. Denote by frðPÞ the frontier of the set P:
; 0Þ þ ð1 À lÞð0; 0Þ; or ðF 1 ; F 2 Þ ¼ lð0; A 4 Þ þ ð1 À lÞð0; 0Þ for some lA½0; 1
POF ðPÞ ¼ fðP 1 ; P 2 ÞAfrðPÞ j ;
The set POF ðPÞ is the Pareto optimal frontier of P: That is, if ðP To see that this is indeed the case observe that frðPÞ is the union of the curves P 1 ¼ A ffiffiffiffiffiffi P 2 p À 2P 2 between P 2 ¼ 0 and 1 9 A 2 ; and the curve 
Proposition 2. A pair of profits, ðP 1 ; P 2 Þ; can be sustained by an SRPE if and only if it belongs to POF ðPÞ:
Proof. First show that ðP 1 ; P 2 ÞePOF ðPÞ cannot be sustained by an SRPE: If ðP 1 ; P 2 ÞePOF ðPÞ there exists a pair ðP Case 2. Subgames in state P j : As before, total profits decrease if the total quantity sold in the futures market increases. The only possibility then for total profits to increase is that Firm i reduces its position in the futures market (recall that, according to the equilibrium strategy, f 
The monopolistic outcome
In a more general setting, firms would be able to buy as well as to sell in the futures market. To evaluate this new possibility, we first consider the case where firms can buy and sell in the futures market only at t 1 ; whereas at t > t 1 they can only sell. I.e., f 1 i may be positive or negative, whereas for all k > 1; f k i X0: The next proposition shows that any outcome can be supported by an SPE, but that only monopolistic outcomes can be sustained by an SRPE. Moreover, the monopolistic quantity has to be divided with the condition that firms get at least the ''Stackelberg follower'' profits. First define the sets: 
where E is a small enough real number. Since total futures positions at time t 1 are still non-positive, at time t 2 Proposition 2 shows that POF ð % PÞ is the set of payoffs in an SRPE at these subgames, where POF ð % PÞ is calculated as POF ðPÞ; except that the demand is p ¼ % A À q; with % A ¼ A À f j À E: According to this, Firm i can obtain no less that 1 16
A 2 in such an equilibrium. The deviation is, then, profitable. This is enough to rule out the original strategy as an SRPE. & Proposition 3 can be generalized for finitely many periods of futures positions not restricted in sign. The case of infinitely many times where firms can buy and sell presents the problem that firms' total futures positions may be undefined for some strategies (for instance, the strategy that requires f
Conclusion
The existing literature attributes a pro-competitive effect to the introduction of a futures market in an oligopolistic industry. We have shown that this need not be the case. In fact, the presence of a futures market may have an anti-competitive effect.
We chose a d iscrete time mod el over one with continuous time for two reasons. First, it makes things simpler. Trigger strategies as the one usedin Proposition 1 are difficult to define in continuous time. The meaning of a statement like ''play s until someone deviates, and then play s 0 afterwards'' is unclear-see [6] for a discussion on this issue. Second, futures and spot markets serve the d emand for one period . We assumed no discount within this period. Thus, the choice of the times when to sell in a futures market is irrelevant. Also, if firms are allowed to sell in the futures market at any point in the interval ½0; 1Þ; the strategy in Proposition 1 would continue to be an equilibrium-a deviation at a time not in T would not report greater profits than at some time in T:
Following A&V we assume that future positions are observable. This is important because if committing to sell a given quantity in the futures market puts a firm in a better situation, it is only natural that the firm wants this fact to be known. Otherwise futures position may be overlooked , and may not give the firm any ad vantage. See [4, 5] for further d iscussions on this issue.
Several extensions are readily suggested, such as the introduction of uncertainty and risk aversion, the study of the role of observability and the information revealed by futures market's prices, and the use of opaque futures markets to conceal collusive behavior. Other lines of research include the extension of our analysis to more than two firms, and to more general demand and cost functions. The main purpose in the present paper is to show a counter-argument to the previous literature, rather than to provide a general result.
Our findings have interesting implications for economic policy towards oligopolies. First, and contrary to A&V, they suggest that the introduction of futures markets is not a substitute for other policies to promote competition. Second, they support the convenience of not allowing producers to have buying positions in future markets.
Interestingly, some empirical evidence for the electricity generation industry in the UK show evid ence that competition has not increased after the introd uction of futures markets (see reports OXERA [7] and Power UK [8] ).
